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CHAIRMAN’S SUMMING UP
FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG
* *
hen the eighth meeting of the European Security Forum was
organised, Robert Kagan had not yet published his landmark article
1
on US-European relations in the July issue of the journal  Policy
Review. Not surprisingly, the propositions set forward in that piece were at the
centre of a particularly lively discussion, after the presentations given by:
-  Madame Nicole Gnesotto, Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies
-  Dr. Viktor Kremenyuk, of the Russian Academy of Sciences
-  Mr. Robert Kagan, Senior Research Fellow at the Carnegie for International
Peace.
The presenters and the participants in the discussion were invited by the
Chairman to bear in mind the following questions:
-  What is the most relevant response to the emerging threat of terrorism of
mass destruction? Are the traditional tools of military power the most
relevant vis à vis what looks less like a Hobbesian jungle (where power goes
to the big and the strong) than a fight against mutating viruses in which small
is both ugly and powerful? Following, are military capabilities, and the
readiness to use them, the primary benchmark for measuring power?
-  Is NATO condemned to play an essentially regional role in managing a
Kantian Europe (“OSCE in uniform”); or will it play a global role? And
wouldn’t the latter option imply that the US military be fully part of NATO,
not simply the comparatively small US European command (EUCOM): is
such an evolution likely?
-  Is the EU as feckless as it is sometimes portrayed? Are we all Woodstock-era
flower children, despite the fact that most EU members have an imperial
legacy and notwithstanding the recurring use of force by a number of
European countries in recent years as well as in the previous decades?
-  Conversely, is the US as ready to act decisively as we are sometimes invited
to believe? More specifically, what does the US refusal to assault Tora Bora
tell us about the US military’s readiness to run risks?
The Chairman also made two points, directed at Mr. Kagan:
                                                
* Chairman of the Geneva Centre for Security Studies and Chairman of the European Security
Forum.
1 “Power and Weakness”, Policy Review, June-July 2002
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-  The choice of  multilateralism is not a mere reflection of weakness. From
1941 onwards until the 1990s, the US chose the multilateral road whenever
possible, with  unilateralism being chosen if there was no other option.
Multilateralism is not simply for wimps.
-  To portray Europe as  Kantian is largely correct; but it’s a double-edged
depiction:  Kant was not pursuing the quest for Perpetual Peace out of
pacifism; he was the philosopher of the categorical imperative. Indeed, he
was widely read in Prussian military academies. Kant is not for wimps either.
-  To these points Robert  Kagan made the following remarks in his
presentation:
-  US instincts are not currently more unilateralist than they were at the
beginning of the Cold War. Current unilateralist trends predated the Bust
administration. However, 9-11 put “unilateralism on steroids”.
-  Concerning military interoperability within NATO, the US is not going to
make itself weaker in order to cater to European military insufficiencies.
-  Europe has an ambitious worldview which calls for more expenditure on the
means of power. Being upset with the US is not providing enough of a
motive for the European to spend more money on defence. Indeed, a
prominent European participant endorsed this view in the subsequent
discussion.
In the ensuing debate, a participant made a vigorous set of comments:
-  The US overemphasises the military component of power.
-  Is Russia the most dynamic element in the current international landscape, as
was put forward by V. Kremenyuk, or is it simply an unstable one?
-  The US needs to take into account the burden represented by the
reunification of the European continent for the EU.
-  To quote  Guillaume  Appolinaire, the Europeans need to learn from
America’s ability to “dare and simplify”: there is a different US relation to
power, with the EU not having the same sense of global responsibility.
Along similar lines, a number of participants queried the nature of Europe’s
identity: is it simply “not America” or is it (as tended to be the view around the
table) more than the negative definition? This query led in turn to the issue of
the generation of an EU strategic culture.
This brought the comment from a European that it is through actions that a
strategic culture would be generated. More generally, he pointed out that ESDP
was motivated by reference to the US, albeit not in a negative sense: ESDP was
established to do what the US wouldn’t do, as well as to work with US. As for
EU introversion, the fact is that there has been no major debate on the EU’sCHAIRMAN’S SUMMING UP
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global role in world affairs, because it hasn’t - until now - needed to have one:
the Convention would have to work on this.
On the degree of divergence between the US and Europe, several European and
American participants suggested that synthesis was more likely than
incompatibility: the US is actually more engaged in soft power than is often
acknowledged (and indeed sometimes more so than the EU, notwithstanding the
latter’s unique contribution to Development aid); nor is the US unhappy at being
a single superpower rather than being part of the more benign European vision;
in any case, a Europe at peace is seen in Washington as a strategic asset for the
US.
To this was added by an American participant the suggestion that the relative
and absolute increase of US power during the last 20 years was probably
slowing down, with information technology no longer driving economic growth,
while the costs of homeland defence are rising: the US should be in the market
for partners. Paul Kennedy has ceased to make his “strategic  overstretch”
argument: he was wrong at the time he made it, he may be wrong again by no
longer making it…
These benign remarks drew some European ripostes: the US was acting in an
aberrant, largely unpredictable manner, as an autocrat who didn’t care about the
views of others. Indeed, notwithstanding US exhortations that the Europeans
should spend more on defence, the US didn’t really want the Europeans to spend
more: the US was quite content to see the Europeans confined to peace-keeping
tasks, while making the point that it is the “mission which makes the coalition”
(a form of denial of the relevance of permanent alliances), and shooting at
European attempts to build up their aerospace and defence-industrial base (with
US moves against ‘Galileo’ being a recent example).
As for the Europeans, the point was made notably from a Russian participant,
that they had no reason to be unduly proud of their soft power role: the US was
leading the field in the former Soviet Union whether in the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Programme, or in nation building in the Caucasus or on migration
issues on the Chinese-Russian border. Similarly, Europeans deplored the EU’s
incapability of “self starting” on the simple, obvious moves: there was no
European-wide action during operation Alba in Albania or the recent deal on the
evacuation of Palestinians from the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. Nor
had there been a European-wide initiative to meet the obvious requirement to
increase defence spending after 9-11: unfortunately, it looks as if nothing short
of a 911 type attack against Europe itself would trigger a serious European
response.
In closing the three speakers made the following points:FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG
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-  The focus is on military power, because this is what divides the American
and the Europeans most, not because it is the only measure of power (R.
Kagan).
-  The two forces which determine the current direction of Russian foreign
policy are the quest for security – with the US being the prime interlocutor –
and economic development, where Europe should play a major role (V.
Kremenyuk).
-  Soft security or so-called low intensity tasks are neither easy nor risk free:
indeed, they can be costly and high risk – but Europe thus tries to avoid the
creation of “future jungles”. As for transatlantic disagreements, the debate on
role of military power is not the most important divergence. The biggest
disagreement is on global governance and democracy in international affairs
(N. Gnesotto).
François Heisbourg1
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY:
A EUROPEAN VIEW
NICOLE GNESOTTO
*
s of mid-2002, taking into account the impact of 11 September, the
prospect of EU enlargement and the emerging work of the Convention
on the Future of the EU, most commentators tend to believe that the
momentum for ESDP has been lost: the Europeans appear to be as divided as
ever, the technological “gap” between European and American military forces is
supposedly increasing every day, the NATO-EU relationship is still in limbo
and, except for the Balkans, where the EU is showing real political involvement,
the Europeans are suspected of being unwilling to tackle any security issue
seriously.
There is no doubt that the Europeans are having some difficulty in adapting to
the new international context created both by the terrorist threats and by political
and military developments in the US after the attacks. Over-militaristic and
hyperunilateralist, the United States has somehow become a destabilising factor
in traditional European security thinking.
1.  New world, new rationale, more ESDP
But it would be a mistake to conclude that the momentum for implementing a
European Security and Defence Policy within the EU framework is dead. The
momentum is changing, simply because the rationale for ESDP is today totally
different from what it was in 1999.
Back to Saint-Malo, there were two main reasons why the 15 decided to include
defence among the EU’s normal competencies. The first related to internal
European debate and policy : a defence dimension was felt necessary in order to
complete CFSP and give the EU more coherence in its foreign policy; the
lessons from the Balkans crisis, and, moreover, the weakness of the EU during
the military campaign in  Kosovo, played an essential role in the EU’s new
determination. The second rationale had to do with transatlantic relations and the
future of NATO: a European military capability was considered necessary to
compensate for the new uncertainty over US military involvement in crisis
management in Europe (both the French and the British learned this from their
experience in Bosnia). It would also be a way for the Europeans to influence
seriously US military strategy, in cases where the US decides to be involved.
                                                
* Director, EU Institute for Security Studies
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And finally, it could help to strengthen NATO by strengthening European
military capabilities, once it was clear that NATO itself had failed to create,
within the old rules of its ESDI, any European political or military momentum.
What has changed in 2002? On the EU side, the issue is not so much ESDP as
how to improve the EU’s CFSP. The real issue is the functioning of CFSP itself
via the questions raised by the Convention: how can the EU define a common
foreign policy with enlargement approaching? What do the 15, and later the 23
or 27, want to do in common vis-à-vis the rest of the world? What might be the
international role of the EU, especially in crisis prevention and crisis resolution,
once it has become the leading economic and demographic power? How will an
enlarged EU be able to decide and to act? In other words, it is now policy, and
not defence, that is (rightly) at the heart of the European debate. Defence has
reverted to its normal role as a technical instrument at the service of a common
policy.
On the transatlantic side, the issue is no longer NATO but the US itself. There is
no point, in this short paper, in listing all the drastic changes that President Bush
has imposed in US military and political thinking. But there is little doubt, in
Europe, that the United States has become a totally new and different actor.
Actually, three conclusions can be drawn from this new US policy. First,
regarding peacekeeping, there is no US uncertainty any more: we know that the
US has other priorities than peacekeeping in the Balkans, Afghanistan or
anywhere else. The US is even more explicit on its refusal to accept this burden.
But we also know that somebody has to do it. So the Europeans will have to do
the job, whether they like it or not, more and more, and increasingly by
themselves. Second, US aversion to multilateral constraints, including within
NATO, will change the ways and means the Europeans will have to find if they
still wish to influence any US policy: this can be done through bilateral
relations, or by creating greater European capabilities. If the US understands
only military criteria, then the EU will have to do more in that area too. Third, if
NATO moves from being a collective constraining organisation to a flexible
reservoir of ad hoc coalitions, then strengthening this new – and enlarged – lego-
type NATO may become problematical: whatever the Europeans decide to do, it
could appear more and more irrelevant to the future of NATO.
The result of this new security context is clear : the paradoxical effect of
terrorism is to make the Petersberg tasks more urgent and more necessary. For
the EU, ESDP is no longer an option but a necessity, whether the Europeans like
it or not:
-  Firstly, for security reasons: either because they will be the only ones able to
carry the future burden of peacekeeping and crisis management, at the
request of the US (it was the Americans who first asked the EU, in December
2001, to take the lead in Macedonia after the end of  NATO’s OperationA EUROPEAN VIEW
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Amber Fox). Or, because the Europeans will feel more and more exposed and
unprotected, if the US is so concerned by other strategic issues, in Asia
notably, that European security becomes the last of its priorities.
-  Secondly, for political reasons, because of the US obsession with military
counting. If the Europeans want to remain capable of operating with the US
in a military coalition, and if they want to be relevant to America in order to
influence US policy, the EU will have to demonstrate that it can speak the
same (military) language as the Americans.
Less America in Europe, more ESDP: this could be the defining formula in
Europe post-11 September.
2.  National sovereignty, still
Since Maastricht (which established the CFSP) and Cologne (ESDP), European
security and defence policy has been implemented within the limits of two
essential constraints: the national sovereignty of member states on the one hand,
the US role and the Atlantic Alliance on the other. The two basic dilemmas have
been how to reconcile national sovereignty and political integration, and how to
reconcile a strategic and political Union with a strong and permanent NATO.
ESDP has been created and implemented in the room for manoeuvre left by
these two issues.
In 2002, these two factors still help to explain both the progress and the limits of
ESDP. But there is now a marked difference between these two traditional
constraints:
-  the US/NATO factor has drastically changed since 11 September. One of the
consequences of this evolution is that the United States is now pushing (more
than preventing) the Europeans to take the lead in crisis management. The
US today acts more as a driving factor than as a limitation on future EU
military responsibility.
-  However, national sovereignty is still, or is still perceived to be, an essential
constraint on future European political integration. The veto right in CFSP
and ESDP remains unquestionable for most of the member states.
The result is that national sovereignty remains the main obstacle to the
development of a military Europe. Implementing CFSP and ESDP depends
more upon the political will of member states than upon the state of the
Alliance. This does not mean at all that ESDP is becoming easier. The problems
are well known: first, the discrepancy in the EU between interventionist and
abstentionist states, and between the specific military strength of each of them.
Second, the different perceptions of power among the member states. Third, the
question of big and small, which can be a kind of red flag in all debates on the
future organisation of a more political EU.NICOLE GNESOTTO
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These are the main questions the Convention will have to address. 2003 will be
the moment of truth both for ESDP and for the EU: by the end of the year, the
headline goal will have to have been met (for the time being, the member states
have fulfilled more than two-thirds of the 144 capability requirements identified
in the Helsinki Catalogue). Equally, at the same date, the Intergovernmental
Conference will have been completed under Italy’s presidency, with the
obligation to adopt the new rules, institutions, and decision-making processes
which will enable the larger EU to work, decide and act, including in security
and defence matters.
3.  Military power, but for what?
But all future developments of ESDP and CFSP will depend on the common
vision that the Europeans arrive at, or not, of the proper international role of the
EU, and thus on the objective and use of power. No doubt the European view
and practice of power are markedly different from America’s.
-  The Europeans seem more convinced than the US about the structural limits
of military power, and the al-Qaeda attacks have reinforced this conviction
for at least two reasons: first, it is precisely because of the unquestionable US
superiority in the military and technological fields that the terrorists have
chosen to engage in asymmetrical warfare against the US, killing civilians
and using civilian assets; the attack against the World Trade Center has been
perceived in Europe as an example of the (unfortunately) successful
circumvention of traditional military power. Second, despite all the new
billion of dollars that the US has decided to spend to increase even more its
strategic superiority, Bin Laden is reportedly still alive and the situation in
the Middle East is getting worse and worse.
-  Equally, dealing with “jungles” using military means alone does not seem to
be the most successful strategy. The Europeans do not contest that the attack
against the  Taliban regime in Afghanistan was necessary and maybe
successful. But what about future or virtual jungles, such as the dozen or so
failed states which exist in Africa, Asia, and even on the fringes of Europe?
The Europeans have the feeling that they are the ones who are trying to deal
with them, with their aid and development strategy, giving priority to this
policy of prevention before these states become new sanctuaries for terrorist
networks. Insisting on non-military means of crisis management will
therefore remain one on the main European differences. “Soft” security is not
an easy thing to deal with, no more, anyway, than all the “hard” wars that the
US claims to be the only one to fight. And this is also a reason why the EU is
so concerned by the priority the Bush administration is giving to military
solutions to Iraq.A EUROPEAN VIEW
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-  Needless to say, the Europeans are also upset by the series of contradictions
in the US obsession with military statistics when it tries to evaluate its
European allies: why should the Europeans be convinced that they should
increase their defence efforts if the US repeatedly shows a preference for
unilateral military actions and ad hoc coalitions where they pick up ad hoc
allies (and often the same ones)? How can the EU take military warfare
seriously if the US proposes task-sharing in which it assigns to Europe the
peacekeeping and peacebuilding burden? Moreover, the Europeans cannot
but notice that every time they try to coordinate their industrial and military
efforts (see the aeronautic or Galileo projects), the US launches a vigorous
industrial campaign against them  Does the US really want the Europeans to
fill the gap, or does it simply want the Europeans to buy American? In the
same way that military power cannot be the alpha and omega of power, the
military gap is not and cannot be, in European eyes, the only criterion for the
future transatlantic partnership.
-  Finally, and maybe most importantly, the Europeans are more concerned by
the cultural gap increasing every day between themselves and their American
counterpart. The so-called “transatlantic community of views” has
disappeared from almost all international issues, from Iraq to the Middle
East, from environmental questions to arms control, from the International
Criminal Court to the status of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, etc. Thus,
the serious Euro-American debate is not between military or soft power, but
between unilateralism and international law, between power and democracy.
The Europeans will definitely stick to the latter.6
CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY LANDSCAPE:
A RUSSIAN VIEW
VICTOR KREMENYUK
n the process of preparing for this meeting I studied some related
publications, including among them the Chaillot Paper 42 (September 2000)
European Defence: Making It Work. A group of well known and, very
possibly, the best European experts headed by François Heisbourg has done it.
And it was not so much the contents of this publication that impressed me,
although what was written there was good. What made me pay special attention
to the subject was the title: “Making it work.” As if the authors writing about
such an important subject had doubts on will it work or not.
A seemingly simple question of defence. Evidently, nations and groups of
nations must defend themselves as well as the principles according to which
they live. But why should one “make it work”? For me it meant that something
important and sophisticated was behind it, that was understood but not said.
And, while preparing a paper on what Russia can, will and should see in
European security for itself, for the preservation of Europe as the source of the
modern civilisation, for the global balance, I continued to ask questions: what
“European defence” means in the wake of the end of the Cold War and
continuing existence of NATO? Does it mean only “there is no more relevant
enemy” or does it means “we should get prepared for totally different security
challenges”?
And in both cases, what should Russia think about it since it lives next door to
Europe, has China at its backdoor, Islamic world under the window and global
USA somewhere around?
Two things are at least clear: first, to look at Russian–European relations,
because so far they have not been probed at full length (and will not be probed
for another decade before the whole paradigm of “Russia” and “Europe” cease
to be what they have been for last 80 years) and, second, to try to put this
dichotomy into a larger context of the current international system. And from
there to get back to the Russia-ESDP issue.
Some Basic Facts
The whole period of the Cold War has strengthened the traditional Russian view
of Western Europe as the source of vital threat. Put together, the age-old
memories of European forays into Russia (Polish, Swedish, French, German)
and ideological idiosyncracies as a result of the Marxist-Leninist view of Europe
have produced an effect on both Russian thinking and Russian strategy, leading
IA RUSSIAN VIEW
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to deep mistrust, suspicion and hostility. Equally, Russian forays into Europe,
starting with early 18
th century, have forged European mistrust and suspicions
towards Russia. Anti-Communism has also worked. Both sides seemed to be
doomed to eternal confrontation.
So far, nothing has happened of a magnitude that would change this tradition
completely. Russia and Europe continue to be two major neighbours on the
continent (added by some US presence), both have developed security strategies
and capabilities and both are capable of taking short-sighted decisions which
may lead to a resumption of their conflicts. Equally, they may take some
decisions based on a longer-term perspective but that would be contrary to their
habits and nature. At the same time, it would be fair to say that a lot has changed
that may break this traditional European setting.
On the one hand, Russia has ceased to be a super-power, an "evil empire" as it
was perceived by many in the West during the Cold War. It is far from having
become a "democratic state" as some observers believe but it is definitely not
that absolutist monolith it was under the Czars or the Commissars. It is evolving
into a regional power still strong enough to deal with any enemy but at the same
time weak economically and incapable of securing its domestic stability through
the prosperity of its population. It vacillates between attempts to build a
democracy following the standards and examples of developed nations and
necessity to adhere to some sort of police regime because of shaky grounds of its
political and economic systems. But, what matters from the security point of
view, it has ceased to be a powerful  contester for Europe in fighting for space
and influence.
Equally Europe has ceased to be a traditional arena of rivalries and competition.
In the economic area, it still has giants which compete for markets. It has some
strong cultural differences but not of the scope and type that may be rated as
"conflicts of civilisations". What matters greatly is the fact that in the political
area due both to the impact of the US and demands of technology, Europe has
become a more homogeneous rather than a heterogeneous entity and is moving
quickly towards becoming a union. This fact has also greatly contributed to the
changes in the field of security and to the relations with Russia.
So, there are evident shifts in the security landscape in the relations between
Russia and Europe and it would be useful to identify, at least, two groups of
issues in this respect: where do these changes go in the foreseeable perspective
(5-10 years) and what impact they may have for Europe both in the EU format
and in a bigger geographical dimension, i.e. including Russia.VICTOR KREMENYUK
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New Developments
Much has already been said about recent changes in Europe. The evolution of
European affairs in the 1990s has been studied many times and the conclusions
seem sometimes suspiciously similar: first, Europe continues to move towards
something which was labelled in the early 20
th century as "the United States of
Europe"; second, that its security agenda changes in the direction of the search
of some new specifically European identity; third, that in this regard it runs into
some structural problems with NATO which until recently was the pivot of
European defence and security; fourth, that Europe is approaching the point of
bifurcation at which it will have to decide on its relations with US, Russia, the
Islamic world and China. While all these questions are in the heads of policy
makers, the reality evolves around with almost no open crises or confrontations.
But, this fact and those suspiciously similar conclusions do not touch upon some
really fundamental questions. Among them are included the division of labour
between NATO and European defence and security policy, relevance of existing
security doctrines and structures.
To begin with, NATO besides solving the issue of confronting the Soviet Union
and its allies, has also played a distinguished role in keeping old European
rivalries, first of all German-French, under control. To a large extent, primarily
by keeping Germany "down". This was the second, if to quote Lord Easmay,
task which NATO has carried out. Security policies in Europe have not become
"nationalised" which helped to avoid a possible race between individual
European nations. Rather, security policy was an instrument of forging cohesion
among the Europeans.
Now, with the changes in relations between East and West, to what extent do
these elements continue to play the role? Does it really matter under the
conditions of "no more enemy" to continue the collectivist approach to security
with all those huge bureaucratic structures? The policy of enlargement helps
only not to answer this question but it is definitely not the answer.
Second, by virtue of a deterrent capacity in nuclear weapons, open hostilities in
Europe (not counting periodical Soviet forays into the territories of its dissident
allies) were a probability and never a reality. The whole security concept
developed as a "possible scenario", although it has never been regarded as a
subject for immediate action. Both sides – Soviet and Europeans – developed
scenarios based not so much on their real doctrines but rather on the assessment
of their mutual capabilities. Disregarding some impressive facts of the mutual
desire to avoid hostilities (as during the Berlin wall crisis in 1961), they still
pretended to believe that their official doctrines were relevant and, hence used
them as basis for security planning. This has helped to the growth of a certain
dichotomy in the Western security planning in the 1990s: on one side,A RUSSIAN VIEW
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continuation of a "search for strategy" (war in Yugoslavia, NATO enlargement);
on the other side, attempts to make security policy more relevant and closer to
real world issues (ESDI).
Equally, it may be detected in the Russian security doctrine: on one hand,
statement of loyalty to the nuclear deterrence, on the other – search for relevant
military tasks in the conventional area. And all this through hot debates within
the Russian military on the priorities and distribution of resources.
Third, Russia has ceased to be an enemy but has not become a friend. So far,
there was no serious effort to evaluate this aspect. There were and are numerous
propagandistic statements declaring Russia a "partner". There are meetings with
Russian authorities both within NATO and EU at which sweet words are said.
But in reality, as an identifiable fact Russia is kept at a distance: it is not (and
will not be) invited to join NATO; it is not invited to join the EU (although there
may be a change on that front). And although it has developed economic ties
with some European nations, Germany and Finland in the first row, it still has
only a chance to become a full member of the WTO and of some other
important institutions.
And this is not simply an explosion of a Russian ego. This is a fact to be
understood for further planning: distance between Russia and Europe may
become a crucial element of the future relationship. If, due to different reasons,
it becomes less, there is a strong hope that Russia will turn into an integral part
of Europe (at least in de Gaulle's understanding: "Europe from  Brest to the
Urals"). If it continues to be as it is, Russia will drift away looking for partners
in the East and South. Then after some time a possibility of new confrontation
will come again.
Two Strategies: Where to go?
The real picture of Europe in the beginning of the 1990s was as follows. On the
Western "front" no serious changes. The alliance survived the Cold War. Only a
few things hinted that there may have been a profound reappraisal of the
existing order: mainly the words that "there was no more enemy" which meant
doubt whether the arrangement of NATO should have survived. On the Eastern
"front" the changes flooded the terrain. The Warsaw Treaty disappeared. The
Soviet Union collapsed. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a
substitute to the USSR was raising more questions than giving answers.
The whole concept of security in Europe collapsed. First, it was no more bloc to
bloc confrontation. Second, it was no longer two hostile worlds facing each
other. Third, instability and disintegration (USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia)
became the obsession of the policy-makers. It was an extremely important
period.VICTOR KREMENYUK
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From the point of view of the Russian interest, the whole problem was revolving
around a central question, what will be the role of Russia in the future European
order. It ceased to be an enemy, it has demobilised its armies; it agreed to the
freedom of both former Soviet allies and former Soviet republics. Now, what
will be its future role in the continent where it had almost half of its legitimate
interests: security, economic, cultural, social.
Abstractly, there could have been two answers to this question and two relevant
strategies. One meant that Russia will be accepted by the Europeans as a full-
size ally and member of the family. In essence, the situation was returned to the
Geneva Conference of 1922 where the issue of ties between Russia and Europe
had to be discussed and ended in isolation of Russia (which in turn turned to
Rapallo Agreement with Germany which to a great extent devalued the
Versailles diktat). Now, after almost 70 years of confrontation, the issue again
has returned to the initial point: Will Europe open its company for dissident
Russia and thus help it to overcome another hard period in its history or will it
abstain, leaving the answer to the moment when Russia will overcome its
problems by its own effort and will no more need European contribution.
The other meant that further European development will go along the way of
incorporating all former Soviet allies and subjects, leaving Russia aside for some
distant future. In the meantime the Central and Eastern Europe will be absorbed
by Western Europe and the continent will re-unite as an anti-Russian or not-
friendly-to-Russia entity. Something like traditional schemes of "Grand Armee"
strategy; Europe versus Russia.
Both strategies and approaches have a right for existence. “Europe versus
Russia” is more traditional, “Europe and Russia” is less traditional and more
doubtful. And, as it seems, there are the questions which loom large in the air in
the current situations to which NATO has almost no answers while the ESDP
may have a profound and perspective approach.
Why ESDP?
It seems strange to make such statements in the wake of NATO-Russia
agreement “at 20”. Formally it may seem that this idea, once put into practice,
may find a solution to two different sets of issues: first, Russian-US relationship
on the basis of quasi-alliance (and thus help Mr.  Putin to avoid forthcoming
criticism of having “sold” Russia on ABM, Caucasus, and other important
issues) and, second, to install a basis for Russia-European rapprochement on
security and cooperation.
But in reality the solution is much more complex and multifaceted. The NATO-
Russia agreement signed in Rome has outreached the scope of traditional NATO
responsibility and overshadowed in that the area of “Petersberg tasks”. NATO
under the strong influence of Washington has decided to pursue two differentA RUSSIAN VIEW
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sets of goals: on one hand, to continue the traditional NATO policy of
enlargement and war preparations (in the Balkans and in the Persian Gulf)
without any changes whatever the Russians say; on the other hand to borrow
some ideas from the ESDP and turn them into the basis for NATO-Russia
cooperation. The herald of this idea was British Prime Minister Tony Blair.
This move has permitted to try to kill two birds with one stone: to pacify Russia,
to help Mr. Putin to hush his domestic critics, and to press the ESDP out from
the fruitful field of security policies which it has identified as realistic,
promising and capable of pulling together Europeans without necessarily
alerting the Americans.
This is the area which in the Soviet times would be typically called “inter-
imperialistic controversies”. In our times it may be labelled as search for
security identities without separation: USA has found it in unilateralism, Europe
– in ESDP, in “Petersberg tasks” which, as it happened, coincided in time with
the American search of a new global enemy (China) and thus helped to the
Europeans to understand that they needed a distinct security policy which will
not drag them into unnecessary conflicts. Both efforts, unilateralism and ESDP
were directed towards Russia. What role it could play if it moves towards
Europeans and absorbs their format? Evidently, there will be a highly promising
entity where both Europe and Russia could largely help each other without
asking assistance from Washington. Cooperation between the two “ Petersberg
subjects” will help to solve challenges to the European security and leave the
USA to its own global tasks.
What would happen if Russia responds to the “at 20” idea and absorbs US
embraces? Evidently, US would strengthen its inclination to deploy NMD, to act
unilaterally in crisis zones (Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Central Asia, India-
Pakistan) leaving thus Europe to its narrow margin. In a way the situation is
unique and unforeseen. Both transatlantic allies have given to Russia the key to
their relationship in security area. All three actors are in a sort of stalemate.
Neither the US nor Europe wanted it. Russia did not expect it.
What Russia could have done if finally it grasps the situation and tries to use it
for its benefit?
First, it may think of some sort of “triangular” relationship putting all the three
in the area where they can be indeed useful to each other and thus serve its
great-power status in Europe, in CIS, in Asia, in relations with both India and
China. Second, it may go further and try to sort out areas of cooperation which
may help both to its own security and to its economic reform through new
investment into the Russian defence and space industries. Third, it may even
think if playing a certain role between the two strategic allies, lubricating or, on
the contrary, exploiting their differences. Finally, fourth, it may think of a sort ofVICTOR KREMENYUK
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“triumvirate” in other areas: Mediterranean and Balkans, Middle East and the
Persian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent.
In any way the security landscape in Europe and in the neighbouring areas
changes. It is not that threatening, it has much less challenges to the all-
European order. But it exists and may hit Europeans into their weakest points:
terrorism, proliferation of weapon of mass destruction, other similar tasks. They
will not be of the scope which will necessarily demand the US involvement but
may still be an overburden for European security efforts if not accompanied by
Russian participation.
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t is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common
view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-
important question of power — the efficacy of power, the morality of power,
the desirability of power — American and European perspectives are diverging.
Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving
beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational
negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and
relative prosperity, the  realization of  Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.” The United
States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic
Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where
true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the
possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and
international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from
Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this
state of affairs is not transitory — the product of one American election or one
catastrophic event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in
development, and likely to endure. When it comes to setting national priorities,
determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing
foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.
It is easier to see the contrast as an American living in Europe. Europeans are
more conscious of the growing differences, perhaps because they fear them
more. European intellectuals are nearly unanimous in the conviction that
Americans and Europeans no longer share a common “strategic culture.” The
European caricature at its most extreme depicts an America dominated by a
“culture of death,” its warlike temperament the natural product of a violent
society where every man has a gun and the death penalty reigns. But even those
who do not make this crude link agree there are profound differences in the way
the United States and Europe conduct foreign policy.
The United States, they argue, resorts to force more quickly and, compared with
Europe, is less patient with diplomacy. Americans generally see the world
divided between good and evil, between friends and enemies, while Europeans
see a more complex picture. When confronting real or potential adversaries,
Americans generally  favor policies of coercion rather than persuasion,
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emphasizing punitive sanctions over inducements to better  behavior, the stick
over the carrot. Americans tend to seek finality in international affairs: They
want problems solved, threats eliminated. And, of course, Americans
increasingly tend toward  unilateralism in international affairs. They are less
inclined to act through international institutions such as the United Nations, less
inclined to work cooperatively with other nations to pursue common goals, more
skeptical about international law, and more willing to operate outside its
strictures when they deem it necessary, or even merely useful.
1
Europeans insist they approach problems with greater nuance and sophistication.
They try to influence others through subtlety and indirection. They are more
tolerant of failure, more patient when solutions don’t come quickly. They
generally  favor peaceful responses to problems, preferring negotiation,
diplomacy, and persuasion to coercion. They are quicker to appeal to
international law, international conventions, and international opinion to
adjudicate disputes. They try to use commercial and economic ties to bind
nations together. They often  emphasize process over result, believing that
ultimately process can become substance.
This European dual portrait is a caricature, of course, with its share of
exaggerations and oversimplifications. One cannot generalize about Europeans:
Britons may have a more “American” view of power than many of their fellow
Europeans on the continent. And there are differing perspectives within nations
on both sides of the Atlantic. In the U.S., Democrats often seem more
“European” than Republicans; Secretary of State Colin Powell may appear more
“European” than Secretary of  Defense Donald  Rumsfeld. Many Americans,
especially among the intellectual elite, are as uncomfortable with the “hard”
quality of American foreign policy as any European; and some Europeans value
power as much as any American.
Nevertheless, the caricatures do capture an essential truth: The United States and
Europe are fundamentally different today. Powell and Rumsfeld have more in
common than do Powell and Hubert Védrine or even Jack Straw. When it comes
to the use of force, mainstream American Democrats have more in common
with Republicans than they do with most European Socialists and Social
Democrats. During the 1990s even American liberals were more willing to
resort to force and were more Manichean in their perception of the world than
most of their European counterparts. The Clinton administration bombed Iraq, as
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well as Afghanistan and Sudan. European governments, it is safe to say, would
not have done so. Whether they would have bombed even Belgrade in 1999, had
the U.S. not forced their hand, is an interesting question.
2
What is the source of these differing strategic perspectives? The question has
received too little attention in recent years, either because foreign policy
intellectuals and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have denied the
existence of a genuine difference or because those who have pointed to the
difference, especially in Europe, have been more interested in assailing the
United States than in understanding why the United States acts as it does —or,
for that matter, why Europe acts as it does. It is past time to move beyond the
denial and the insults and to face the problem head-on.
Despite what many Europeans and some Americans believe, these differences in
strategic culture do not spring naturally from the national characters of
Americans and Europeans. After all, what Europeans now consider their more
peaceful strategic culture is, historically speaking, quite new. It represents an
evolution away from the very different strategic culture that dominated Europe
for hundreds of years and at least until World War I. The European governments
— and peoples — who enthusiastically launched themselves into that
continental war believed in  machtpolitik. While the roots of the present
European worldview, like the roots of the European Union itself, can be traced
back to the Enlightenment, Europe’s great-power politics for the past 300 years
did not follow the visionary designs of the philosophes and the physiocrats.
As for the United States, there is nothing timeless about the present heavy
reliance on force as a tool of international relations, nor about the tilt toward
unilateralism and away from a devotion to international law. Americans are
children of the Enlightenment, too, and in the early years of the republic were
more faithful apostles of its creed. America’s eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century statesmen sounded much like the European statesmen of today, extolling
the virtues of commerce as the soothing balm of international strife and
appealing to international law and international opinion over brute force. The
young United States wielded power against weaker peoples on the North
American continent, but when it came to dealing with the European giants, it
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claimed to abjure power and assailed as atavistic the power politics of the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European empires.
Two centuries later, Americans and Europeans have traded places — and
perspectives. Partly this is because in those 200 years, but especially in recent
decades, the power equation has shifted dramatically: When the United States
was weak, it practiced the strategies of indirection, the strategies of weakness;
now that the United States is powerful, it behaves as powerful nations do. When
the European great powers were strong, they believed in strength and martial
glory. Now, they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers. These very
different points of view, weak versus strong, have naturally produced differing
strategic judgments, differing assessments of threats and of the proper means of
addressing threats, and even differing calculations of interest.
But this is only part of the answer. For along with these natural consequences of
the transatlantic power gap, there has also opened a broad ideological gap.
Europe, because of its unique historical experience of the past half-century —
culminating in the past decade with the creation of the European Union — has
developed a set of ideals and principles regarding the utility and morality of
power different from the ideals and principles of Americans, who have not
shared that experience. If the strategic chasm between the United States and
Europe appears greater than ever today, and grows still wider at a worrying
pace, it is because these material and ideological differences reinforce one
another. The divisive trend they together produce may be impossible to reverse.
The power gap: perception and reality
Europe has been militarily weak for a long time, but until fairly recently its
weakness had been obscured. World War II all but destroyed European nations
as global powers, and their postwar inability to project sufficient force overseas
to maintain colonial empires in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East forced them to
retreat on a massive scale after more than five centuries of imperial dominance
— perhaps the most significant retrenchment of global influence in human
history. For a half-century after World War II, however, this weakness was
masked by the unique geopolitical circumstances of the Cold War. Dwarfed by
the two superpowers on its flanks, a weakened Europe nevertheless served as the
central strategic  theater of the  worldwide struggle between communism and
democratic capitalism. Its sole but vital strategic mission was to defend its own
territory against any Soviet offensive, at least until the Americans arrived.
Although shorn of most traditional measures of great-power status, Europe
remained the geopolitical pivot, and this, along with lingering habits of world
leadership, allowed Europeans to retain international influence well beyond
what their sheer military capabilities might have afforded.POWER AND WEAKNESS
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Europe lost this strategic centrality after the Cold War ended, but it took a few
more years for the lingering mirage of European global power to fade. During
the 1990s, war in the Balkans kept both Europeans and Americans focused on
the strategic importance of the continent and on the continuing relevance of
nato. The enlargement of nato to include former Warsaw Pact nations and the
consolidation of the Cold War victory kept Europe in the forefront of the
strategic discussion.
Then there was the early promise of the “new Europe.” By bonding together into
a single political and economic unit — the historic accomplishment of the
Maastricht treaty in 1992 — many hoped to recapture Europe’s old greatness but
in a new political form. “Europe” would be the next superpower, not only
economically and politically, but also militarily. It would handle crises on the
European continent, such as the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, and it would re-
emerge as a global player. In the 1990s Europeans could confidently assert that
the power of a unified Europe would restore, finally, the global “multipolarity”
that had been destroyed by the Cold War and its aftermath. And most
Americans, with mixed emotions, agreed that superpower Europe was the
future. Harvard University’s Samuel P. Huntington predicted that the coalescing
of the European Union would be “the single most important move” in a
worldwide reaction against American hegemony and would produce a “truly
multipolar” twenty-first century.
3
But European pretensions and American apprehensions proved unfounded. The
1990s witnessed not the rise of a European superpower but the decline of
Europe into relative weakness. The Balkan conflict at the beginning of the
decade revealed European military incapacity and political disarray; the Kosovo
conflict at decade’s end exposed a transatlantic gap in military technology and
the ability to wage modern warfare that would only widen in subsequent years.
Outside of Europe, the disparity by the close of the 1990s was even more starkly
apparent as it became clear that the ability of European powers, individually or
collectively, to project decisive force into regions of conflict beyond the
continent was negligible. Europeans could provide peacekeeping forces in the
Balkans — indeed, they could and eventually did provide the vast bulk of those
forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. But they lacked the wherewithal to introduce and
sustain a fighting force in potentially hostile territory, even in Europe. Under the
best of circumstances, the European role was limited to filling out peacekeeping
forces after the United States had, largely on its own, carried out the decisive
phases of a military mission and stabilized the situation. As some Europeans put
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it, the real division of labor consisted of the United States “making the dinner”
and the Europeans “doing the dishes.”
This inadequacy should have come as no surprise, since these were the
limitations that had forced Europe to retract its global influence in the first place.
Those Americans and Europeans who proposed that Europe expand its strategic
role beyond the continent set an unreasonable goal. During the Cold War,
Europe’s strategic role had been to defend itself. It was unrealistic to expect a
return to international great-power status, unless European peoples were willing
to shift significant resources from social programs to military programs.
Clearly they were not. Not only were Europeans unwilling to pay to project
force beyond Europe. After the Cold War, they would not pay for sufficient
force to conduct even minor military actions on the continent without American
help. Nor did it seem to matter whether European publics were being asked to
spend money to strengthen nato or an independent European foreign and defense
policy. Their answer was the same. Rather than viewing the collapse of the
Soviet Union as an opportunity to flex global muscles, Europeans took it as an
opportunity to cash in on a sizable peace dividend. Average European defense
budgets gradually fell below 2 percent of  gdp. Despite talk of establishing
Europe as a global superpower, therefore, European military capabilities steadily
fell behind those of the United States throughout the 1990s.
The end of the Cold War had a very different effect on the other side of the
Atlantic. For although Americans looked for a peace dividend, too, and defense
budgets declined or remained flat during most of the 1990s, defense spending
still remained above 3 percent of gdp. Fast on the heels of the Soviet empire’s
demise came Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the largest American military action
in a quarter-century. Thereafter American administrations cut the Cold War
force, but not as dramatically as might have been expected. By historical
standards, America’s military power and particularly its ability to project that
power to all corners of the globe remained unprecedented.
Meanwhile, the very fact of the Soviet empire’s collapse vastly increased
America’s strength relative to the rest of the world. The  sizable American
military arsenal, once barely sufficient to balance Soviet power, was now
deployed in a world without a single formidable adversary. This “ unipolar
moment” had an entirely natural and predictable consequence: It made the
United States more willing to use force abroad. With the check of Soviet power
removed, the United States was free to intervene practically wherever and
whenever it chose — a fact reflected in the proliferation of overseas military
interventions that began during the first Bush administration with the invasion of
Panama in 1989, the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and the humanitarian
intervention in Somalia in 1992, continuing during the Clinton years with
interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. While American politicians talkedPOWER AND WEAKNESS
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of pulling back from the world, the reality was an America intervening abroad
more frequently than it had throughout most of the Cold War. Thanks to new
technologies, the United States was also freer to use force around the world in
more limited ways through air and missile strikes, which it did with increasing
frequency.
How could this growing transatlantic power gap fail to create a difference in
strategic perceptions? Even during the Cold War, American military
predominance and Europe’s relative weakness had produced important and
sometimes serious disagreements.  Gaullism,  Ostpolitik, and the various
movements for European independence and unity were manifestations not only
of a European desire for  honor and freedom of action. They also reflected a
European conviction that America’s approach to the Cold War was too
confrontational, too militaristic, and too dangerous. Europeans believed they
knew better how to deal with the Soviets: through engagement and seduction,
through commercial and political ties, through patience and forbearance. It was
a legitimate view, shared by many Americans. But it also reflected Europe’s
weakness relative to the United States, the fewer military options at Europe’s
disposal, and its greater vulnerability to a powerful Soviet Union. It may have
reflected, too, Europe’s memory of continental war. Americans, when they were
not themselves engaged in the subtleties of détente, viewed the European
approach as a form of appeasement, a return to the fearful mentality of the
1930s. But appeasement is never a dirty word to those whose genuine weakness
offers few appealing alternatives. For them, it is a policy of sophistication.
The end of the Cold War, by widening the power gap, exacerbated the
disagreements. Although transatlantic tensions are now widely assumed to have
begun with the inauguration of George W. Bush in January 2001, they were
already evident during the Clinton administration and may even be traced back
to the administration of George H.W. Bush. By 1992, mutual recriminations
were rife over Bosnia, where the United States refused to act and Europe could
not act. It was during the Clinton years that Europeans began complaining about
being lectured by the “hectoring hegemon.” This was also the period in which
Védrine coined the term hyperpuissance to describe an American behemoth too
worryingly powerful to be designated merely a superpower. (Perhaps he was
responding to then-Secretary of State Madeleine  Albright’s insistence that the
United States was the world’s “indispensable nation.”) It was also during the
1990s that the transatlantic disagreement over American plans for missile
defense emerged and many Europeans began grumbling about the American
propensity to choose force and punishment over diplomacy and persuasion.
The Clinton administration, meanwhile, though relatively timid and restrained
itself, grew angry and impatient with European timidity, especially the
unwillingness to confront Saddam Hussein. The split in the alliance over IraqROBERT KAGAN
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didn’t begin with the 2000 election but in 1997, when the Clinton administration
tried to increase the pressure on Baghdad and found itself at odds with France
and (to a lesser extent) Great Britain in the United Nations Security Council.
Even the war in  Kosovo was marked by nervousness among some allies —
especially Italy, Greece, and Germany — that the United States was too
uncompromisingly militaristic in its approach. And while Europeans and
Americans ultimately stood together in the confrontation with Belgrade, the
Kosovo war produced in Europe less satisfaction at the successful prosecution of
the war than unease at America’s apparent omnipotence. That apprehension
would only increase in the wake of American military action after September
11, 2001.
The psychology of power and weakness
Today’s transatlantic problem, in short, is not a George Bush problem. It is a
power problem. American military strength has produced a propensity to use
that strength. Europe’s military weakness has produced a perfectly
understandable aversion to the exercise of military power. Indeed, it has
produced a powerful European interest in inhabiting a world where strength
doesn’t matter, where international law and international institutions
predominate, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all
nations regardless of their strength have equal rights and are equally protected
by commonly agreed-upon international rules of  behavior. Europeans have a
deep interest in devaluing and eventually eradicating the brutal laws of an
anarchic, Hobbesian world where power is the ultimate determinant of national
security and success.
This is no reproach. It is what weaker powers have wanted from time
immemorial. It was what Americans wanted in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, when the brutality of a European system of power politics
run by the global giants of France, Britain, and Russia left Americans constantly
vulnerable to imperial thrashing. It was what the other small powers of Europe
wanted in those years, too, only to be sneered at by Bourbon kings and other
powerful monarchs, who spoke instead of raison d’état. The great proponent of
international law on the high seas in the eighteenth century was the United
States; the great opponent was Britain’s navy, the “Mistress of the Seas.” In an
anarchic world, small powers always fear they will be victims. Great powers, on
the other hand, often fear rules that may constrain them more than they fear the
anarchy in which their power brings security and prosperity.
This natural and historic disagreement between the stronger and the weaker
manifests itself in today’s transatlantic dispute over the question of
unilateralism. Europeans generally believe their objection to American
unilateralism is proof of their greater commitment to certain ideals concerningPOWER AND WEAKNESS
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world order. They are less willing to acknowledge that their hostility to
unilateralism is also self-interested. Europeans fear American  unilateralism.
They fear it perpetuates a  Hobbesian world in which they may become
increasingly vulnerable. The United States may be a relatively benign hegemon,
but insofar as its actions delay the arrival of a world order more conducive to the
safety of weaker powers, it is objectively dangerous.
This is one reason why in recent years a principal objective of European foreign
policy has become, as one European observer puts it, the “multilateralising” of
the United States.
4 It is not that Europeans are teaming up against the American
hegemon, as Huntington and many realist theorists would have it, by creating a
countervailing power. After all, Europeans are not increasing their power. Their
tactics, like their goal, are the tactics of the weak. They hope to constrain
American power without wielding power themselves. In what may be the
ultimate feat of subtlety and indirection, they want to control the behemoth by
appealing to its conscience.
It is a sound strategy, as far as it goes. The United States is a behemoth with a
conscience. It is not Louis xiv’s France or George iii’s England. Americans do
not argue, even to themselves, that their actions may be justified by raison
d’état. Americans have never accepted the principles of Europe’s old order,
never embraced the Machiavellian perspective. The United States is a liberal,
progressive society through and through, and to the extent that Americans
believe in power, they believe it must be a means of advancing the principles of
a liberal civilization and a liberal world order. Americans even share Europe’s
aspirations for a more orderly world system based not on power but on rules —
after all, they were striving for such a world when Europeans were still extolling
the laws of machtpolitik.
But while these common ideals and aspirations shape foreign policies on both
sides of the Atlantic, they cannot completely negate the very different
perspectives from which Europeans and Americans view the world and the role
of power in international affairs. Europeans oppose unilateralism in part because
they have no capacity for unilateralism. Polls consistently show that Americans
support multilateral action in principle — they even support acting under the
rubric of the United Nations — but the fact remains that the United States can
act unilaterally, and has done so many times with reasonable success. For
Europeans, the appeal to  multilateralism and international law has a real
practical payoff and little cost. For Americans, who stand to lose at least some
                                                
4 Steven Everts, “Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?: Managing Divergence in
Transatlantic Foreign Policy,” Centre for European Reform working paper (February 2001).ROBERT KAGAN
22
freedom of action, support for universal rules of behavior really is a matter of
idealism.
Even when Americans and Europeans can agree on the kind of world order they
would strive to build, however, they increasingly disagree about what constitutes
a threat to that international endeavor. Indeed, Europeans and Americans differ
most these days in their evaluation of what constitutes a tolerable versus an
intolerable threat. This, too, is consistent with the disparity of power.
Europeans often argue that Americans have an unreasonable demand for
“perfect” security, the product of living for centuries shielded behind two
oceans.
5 Europeans claim they know what it is like to live with danger, to exist
side-by-side with evil, since they’ve done it for centuries. Hence their greater
tolerance for such threats as may be posed by Saddam  Hussein’s Iraq or the
ayatollahs’ Iran. Americans, they claim, make far too much of the dangers these
regimes pose.
Even before September 11, this argument rang a bit hollow. The United States in
its formative decades lived in a state of substantial insecurity, surrounded by
hostile European empires, at constant risk of being torn apart by centrifugal
forces that were encouraged by threats from without: National insecurity formed
the core of Washington’s Farewell Address. As for the Europeans’ supposed
tolerance for insecurity and evil, it can be overstated. For the better part of three
centuries, European Catholics and Protestants more often preferred to kill than
to tolerate each other; nor have the past two centuries shown all that much
mutual tolerance between Frenchmen and Germans.
Some Europeans argue that precisely because Europe has suffered so much, it
has a higher tolerance for suffering than America and therefore a higher
tolerance for threats. More likely the opposite is true. The memory of their
horrendous suffering in World War I made the British and French publics more
fearful of Nazi Germany, not more tolerant, and this attitude contributed
significantly to the appeasement of the 1930s.
A better explanation of Europe’s greater tolerance for threats is, once again,
Europe’s relative weakness. Tolerance is also very much a realistic response in
that Europe, precisely because it is weak, actually faces fewer threats than the
far more powerful United States.
The psychology of weakness is easy enough to understand. A man armed only
with a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger,
inasmuch as the alternative — hunting the bear armed only with a knife — is
actually riskier than lying low and hoping the bear never attacks. The same man
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armed with a rifle, however, will likely make a different calculation of what
constitutes a tolerable risk. Why should he risk being mauled to death if he
doesn’t need to?
This perfectly normal human psychology is helping to drive a wedge between
the United States and Europe today. Europeans have concluded, reasonably
enough, that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is more tolerable for them than
the risk of removing him. But Americans, being stronger, have reasonably
enough developed a lower threshold of tolerance for Saddam and his weapons of
mass destruction, especially after September 11. Europeans like to say that
Americans are obsessed with fixing problems, but it is generally true that those
with a greater capacity to fix problems are more likely to try to fix them than
those who have no such capability. Americans can imagine successfully
invading Iraq and toppling  Saddam, and therefore more than 70 percent of
Americans apparently  favor such action. Europeans, not surprisingly, find the
prospect both unimaginable and frightening.
The incapacity to respond to threats leads not only to tolerance but sometimes to
denial. It’s normal to try to put out of one’s mind that which one can do nothing
about. According to one student of European opinion, even the very focus on
“threats” differentiates American policymakers from their European
counterparts. Americans, writes Steven Everts, talk about foreign “threats” such
as “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and ‘rogue
states.’” But Europeans look at “challenges,” such as “ethnic conflict, migration,
organized crime, poverty and environmental degradation.” As  Everts notes,
however, the key difference is less a matter of culture and philosophy than of
capability. Europeans “are most worried about issues . . . that have a greater
chance of being solved by political engagement and huge sums of money.” In
other words, Europeans focus on issues — “challenges” — where European
strengths come into play but not on those “threats” where European weakness
makes solutions elusive. If Europe’s strategic culture today places less value on
power and military strength and more value on such soft-power tools as
economics and trade, isn’t it partly because Europe is militarily weak and
economically strong? Americans are quicker to acknowledge the existence of
threats, even to perceive them where others may not see any, because they can
conceive of doing something to meet those threats.
The differing threat perceptions in the United States and Europe are not just
matters of psychology, however. They are also grounded in a practical reality
that is another product of the disparity of power. For Iraq and other “rogue”
states objectively do not pose the same level of threat to Europeans as they do to
the United States. There is, first of all, the American security guarantee that
Europeans enjoy and have enjoyed for six decades, ever since the United States
took upon itself the burden of maintaining order in far-flung regions of theROBERT KAGAN
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world — from the Korean Peninsula to the Persian Gulf — from which
European power had largely withdrawn. Europeans generally believe, whether
or not they admit it to themselves, that were Iraq ever to emerge as a real and
present danger, as opposed to merely a potential danger, then the United States
would do something about it — as it did in 1991. If during the Cold War Europe
by necessity made a major contribution to its own  defense, today Europeans
enjoy an unparalleled measure of “free security” because most of the likely
threats are in regions outside Europe, where only the United States can project
effective force. In a very practical sense — that is, when it comes to actual
strategic planning — neither Iraq nor Iran nor North Korea nor any other
“rogue” state in the world is primarily a European problem. Nor, certainly, is
China. Both Europeans and Americans agree that these are primarily American
problems.
This is why Saddam Hussein is not as great a threat to Europe as he is to the
United States. He would be a greater threat to the United States even were the
Americans and Europeans in complete agreement on Iraq policy, because it is
the logical consequence of the transatlantic disparity of power. The task of
containing  Saddam Hussein belongs primarily to the United States, not to
Europe, and everyone agrees on this
6 — including  Saddam, which is why he
considers the United States, not Europe, his principal adversary. In the Persian
Gulf, in the Middle East, and in most other regions of the world (including
Europe), the United States plays the role of ultimate enforcer. “You are so
powerful,” Europeans often say to Americans. “So why do you feel so
threatened?” But it is precisely America’s great power that makes it the primary
target, and often the only target. Europeans are understandably content that it
should remain so.
Americans are “cowboys,” Europeans love to say. And there is truth in this. The
United States does act as an international sheriff, self-appointed perhaps but
widely welcomed nevertheless, trying to enforce some peace and justice in what
Americans see as a lawless world where outlaws need to be deterred or
destroyed, and often through the muzzle of a gun. Europe, by this old West
analogy, is more like a saloonkeeper. Outlaws shoot sheriffs, not saloonkeepers.
In fact, from the saloonkeeper’s point of view, the sheriff trying to impose order
by force can sometimes be more threatening than the outlaws who, at least for
the time being, may just want a drink.
When Europeans took to the streets by the millions after September 11, most
Americans believed it was out of a sense of shared danger and common interest:
The Europeans knew they could be next. But Europeans by and large did not
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feel that way and still don’t. Europeans do not really believe they are next. They
may be secondary targets — because they are allied with the U.S. — but they
are not the primary target, because they no longer play the imperial role in the
Middle East that might have engendered the same antagonism against them as is
aimed at the United States. When Europeans wept and waved American flags
after September 11, it was out of genuine human sympathy, sorrow, and
affection for Americans. For better or for worse, European displays of solidarity
were a product more of fellow-feeling than self-interest.
The origins of modern European foreign policy
Important as the power gap may be in shaping the respective strategic cultures
of the United States and Europe, it is only one part of the story. Europe in the
past half-century has developed a genuinely different perspective on the role of
power in international relations, a perspective that springs directly from its
unique historical experience since the end of World War II. It is a perspective
that Americans do not share and cannot share, inasmuch as the formative
historical experiences on their side of the Atlantic have not been the same.
Consider again the qualities that make up the European strategic culture: the
emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on international law
over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on  multilateralism over
unilateralism. It is true that these are not traditionally European approaches to
international relations when viewed from a long historical perspective. But they
are a product of more recent European history. The modern European strategic
culture represents a conscious rejection of the European past, a rejection of the
evils of European  machtpolitik. It is a reflection of Europeans’ ardent and
understandable desire never to return to that past. Who knows better than
Europeans the dangers that arise from unbridled power politics, from an
excessive reliance on military force, from policies produced by national egoism
and ambition, even from balance of power and raison d’état? As German
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer put it in a speech outlining his vision of the
European future at Humboldt University in Berlin (May 12, 2000), “The core of
the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European
balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states
that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.” The European
Union is itself the product of an awful century of European warfare.
Of course, it was the “hegemonic ambitions” of one nation in particular that
European integration was meant to contain. And it is the integration and taming
of Germany that is the great accomplishment of Europe — viewed historically,
perhaps the greatest feat of international politics ever achieved. Some Europeans
recall, as Fischer does, the central role played by the United States in solving the
“German problem.” Fewer like to recall that the military destruction of NaziROBERT KAGAN
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Germany was the prerequisite for the European peace that followed. Most
Europeans believe that it was the transformation of European politics, the
deliberate abandonment and rejection of centuries of  machtpolitik, that in the
end made possible the “new order.” The Europeans, who invented power
politics, turned themselves into born-again idealists by an act of will, leaving
behind them what Fischer called “the old system of balance with its continued
national orientation, constraints of coalition, traditional interest-led politics and
the permanent danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations.”
Fischer stands near one end of the spectrum of European idealism. But this is
not really a right-left issue in Europe. Fischer’s principal contention — that
Europe has moved beyond the old system of power politics and discovered a
new system for preserving peace in international relations — is widely shared
across Europe. As senior British diplomat Robert Cooper recently wrote in the
Observer (April 7, 2002), Europe today lives in a “postmodern system” that does
not rest on a balance of power but on “the rejection of force” and on “self-
enforced rules of behavior.” In the “postmodern world,” writes Cooper, “raison
d’état and the amorality of  Machiavelli’s theories of  statecraft have been
replaced by a moral consciousness” in international affairs.
American realists might scoff at this idealism. George F. Kennan assumed only
his naïve fellow Americans succumbed to such “ Wilsonian” legalistic and
moralistic fancies, not those war-tested, historically minded European
Machiavels. But, really, why shouldn’t Europeans be idealistic about
international affairs, at least as they are conducted in Europe’s “ postmodern
system”? Within the confines of Europe, the age-old laws of international
relations have been repealed. Europeans have stepped out of the  Hobbesian
world of anarchy into the  Kantian world of perpetual peace. European life
during the more than five decades since the end of World War II has been
shaped not by the brutal laws of power politics but by the unfolding of a
geopolitical fantasy, a miracle of world-historical importance: The German lion
has laid down with the French lamb. The conflict that ravaged Europe ever since
the violent birth of Germany in the nineteenth century has been put to rest.
The means by which this miracle has been achieved have understandably
acquired something of a sacred mystique for Europeans, especially since the end
of the Cold War. Diplomacy, negotiations, patience, the forging of economic
ties, political engagement, the use of inducements rather than sanctions, the
taking of small steps and tempering ambitions for success — these were the
tools of Franco-German rapprochement and hence the tools that made European
integration possible. Integration was not to be based on military deterrence or
the balance of power. Quite the contrary. The miracle came from the rejection of
military power and of its utility as an instrument of international affairs — at
least within the confines of Europe. During the Cold War, few EuropeansPOWER AND WEAKNESS
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doubted the need for military power to deter the Soviet Union. But within
Europe the rules were different.
Collective security was provided from without, meanwhile, by the  deus ex
machina of the United States operating through the military structures of nato.
Within this wall of security, Europeans pursued their new order, freed from the
brutal laws and even the mentality of power politics. This evolution from the old
to the new began in Europe during the Cold War. But the end of the Cold War,
by removing even the external danger of the Soviet Union, allowed Europe’s
new order, and its new idealism, to blossom fully. Freed from the requirements
of any military deterrence, internal or external, Europeans became still more
confident that their way of settling international problems now had universal
application.
“The genius of the founding fathers,” European Commission President Romano
Prodi commented in a speech at the Institute d’Etudes Politiques in Paris (May
29, 2001), “lay in translating extremely high political ambitions into a series of
more specific, almost technical decisions. This indirect approach made further
action possible. Rapprochement took place gradually. From confrontation we
moved to willingness to  cooperate in the economic sphere and then on to
integration.” This is what many Europeans believe they have to offer the world:
not power, but the transcendence of power. The “essence” of the European
Union, writes Everts, is “all about subjecting inter-state relations to the rule of
law,” and Europe’s experience of successful multilateral governance has in turn
produced an ambition to convert the world. Europe “has a role to play in world
‘governance,’” says Prodi, a role based on replicating the European experience
on a global scale. In Europe “the rule of law has replaced the crude interplay of
power . . . power politics have lost their influence.” And by “making a success
of integration we are demonstrating to the world that it is possible to create a
method for peace.”
No doubt there are Britons, Germans, French, and others who would frown on
such exuberant idealism. But many Europeans, including many in positions of
power, routinely apply Europe’s experience to the rest of the world. For is not
the general European critique of the American approach to “rogue” regimes
based on this special European insight? Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya — these
states may be dangerous and unpleasant, even evil. But might not an “indirect
approach” work again, as it did in Europe? Might it not be possible once more to
move from confrontation to rapprochement, beginning with  cooperation in the
economic sphere and then moving on to peaceful integration? Could not the
formula that worked in Europe work again with Iran or even Iraq? A great many
Europeans insist that it can.
The transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become
Europe’s new mission civilisatrice. Just as Americans have always believed thatROBERT KAGAN
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they had discovered the secret to human happiness and wished to export it to the
rest of the world, so the Europeans have a new mission born of their own
discovery of perpetual peace.
Thus we arrive at what may be the most important reason for the divergence in
views between Europe and the United States. America’s power, and its
willingness to exercise that power — unilaterally if necessary — represents a
threat to Europe’s new sense of mission. Perhaps the greatest threat. American
policymakers find it hard to believe, but leading officials and politicians in
Europe worry more about how the United States might handle or mishandle the
problem of Iraq — by undertaking unilateral and extralegal military action —
than they worry about Iraq itself and  Saddam  Hussein’s weapons of mass
destruction. And while it is true that they fear such action might destabilize the
Middle East and lead to the unnecessary loss of life, there is a deeper concern.
7
Such American action represents an assault on the essence of “ postmodern”
Europe. It is an assault on Europe’s new ideals, a denial of their universal
validity, much as the monarchies of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe
were an assault on American republican ideals. Americans ought to be the first
to understand that a threat to one’s beliefs can be as frightening as a threat to
one’s physical security.
As Americans have for two centuries, Europeans speak with great confidence of
the superiority of their global understanding, the wisdom they have to offer
other nations about conflict resolution, and their way of addressing international
problems. But just as in the first decade of the American republic, there is a hint
of insecurity in the European claim to “success,” an evident need to have their
success affirmed and their views accepted by other nations, particularly by the
mighty United States. After all, to deny the validity of the new European
idealism is to raise profound doubts about the viability of the European project.
If international problems cannot, in fact, be settled the European way, wouldn’t
that suggest that Europe itself may eventually fall short of a solution, with all the
horrors this implies?
And, of course, it is precisely this fear that still hangs over Europeans, even as
Europe moves forward. Europeans, and particularly the French and Germans,
are not entirely sure that the problem once known as the “German problem”
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really has been solved. As their various and often very different proposals for
the future constitution of Europe suggest, the French are still not confident they
can trust the Germans, and the Germans are still not sure they can trust
themselves. This fear can at times hinder progress toward deeper integration, but
it also propels the European project forward despite innumerable obstacles. The
European project must succeed, for how else to overcome what Fischer, in his
Humboldt University speech, called “the risks and temptations objectively
inherent in Germany’s dimensions and central situation”? Those historic
German “temptations” play at the back of many a European mind. And every
time Europe contemplates the use of military force, or is forced to do so by the
United States, there is no avoiding at least momentary consideration of what
effect such a military action might have on the “German question.”
Perhaps it is not just coincidence that the amazing progress toward European
integration in recent years has been accompanied not by the emergence of a
European superpower but, on the contrary, by a diminishing of European
military capabilities relative to the United States. Turning Europe into a global
superpower capable of balancing the power of the United States may have been
one of the original selling points of the European Union — an independent
European foreign and  defense policy was supposed to be one of the most
important  byproducts of European integration. But, in truth, the ambition for
European “power” is something of an anachronism. It is an atavistic impulse,
inconsistent with the ideals of  postmodern Europe, whose very existence
depends on the rejection of power politics. Whatever its architects may have
intended, European integration has proved to be the enemy of European military
power and, indeed, of an important European global role.
This phenomenon has manifested itself not only in flat or declining European
defense budgets, but in other ways, too, even in the realm of “soft” power.
European leaders talk of Europe’s essential role in the world. Prodi yearns “to
make our voice heard, to make our actions count.” And it is true that Europeans
spend a great deal of money on foreign aid — more per capita, they like to point
out, than does the United States. Europeans engage in overseas military
missions, so long as the missions are mostly limited to peacekeeping. But while
the  eu periodically dips its fingers into troubled international waters in the
Middle East or the Korean Peninsula, the truth is that  eu foreign policy is
probably the most  anemic of all the products of European integration. As
Charles Grant, a sympathetic observer of the eu, recently noted, few European
leaders “are giving it much time or energy.”
8 eu foreign policy initiatives tend to
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be short-lived and are rarely backed by sustained agreement on the part of the
various European powers. That is one reason they are so easily rebuffed, as was
the case in late March when Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon blocked  eu
foreign policy chief Javier Solana from meeting with Yasser Arafat (only to turn
around the next day and allow a much lower-ranking American negotiator to
meet with the Palestinian leader).
It is obvious, moreover, that issues outside of Europe don’t attract nearly as
much interest among Europeans as purely European issues do. This has
surprised and frustrated Americans on all sides of the political and strategic
debate: Recall the profound disappointment of American liberals when
Europeans failed to mount an effective protest against Bush’s withdrawal from
the abm treaty. But given the enormous and difficult agenda of integration, this
European tendency to look inward is understandable.  eu enlargement, the
revision of the common economic and agricultural policies, the question of
national sovereignty versus supranational governance, the so-called democracy
deficit, the jostling of the large European powers, the dissatisfaction of the
smaller powers, the establishment of a new European constitution — all of these
present serious and unavoidable challenges. The difficulties of moving forward
might seem insuperable were it not for the progress the project of European
integration has already demonstrated.
American policies that are unwelcome on substance — on a missile  defense
system and the abm treaty, belligerence toward Iraq, support for Israel — are all
the more unwelcome because for Europe, they are a distraction. Europeans often
point to American insularity and parochialism. But Europeans themselves have
turned intensely introspective. As Dominique  Moisi noted in the Financial
Times (March 11, 2002), the recent French presidential campaign saw “no
reference . . . to the events of September 11 and their far-reaching
consequences.” No one asked, “What should be the role of France and Europe in
the new configuration of forces created after September 11? How should France
reappraise its military budget and doctrine to take account of the need to
maintain some kind of parity between Europe and the United States, or at least
between France and the uk?” The Middle East conflict became an issue in the
campaign because of France’s large Arab and Muslim population, as the high
vote for Le Pen demonstrated. But Le Pen is not a foreign policy hawk. And as
Moisi noted, “for most French voters in 2002, security has little to do with
abstract and distant geopolitics. Rather, it is a question of which politician can
best protect them from the crime and violence plaguing the streets and suburbs
of their cities.”
Can Europe change course and assume a larger role on the world stage? There
has been no shortage of European leaders urging it to do so. Nor is the weakness
of  eu foreign policy today necessarily proof that it must be weak tomorrow,POWER AND WEAKNESS
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given the  eu’s record of overcoming weaknesses in other areas. And yet the
political will to demand more power for Europe appears to be lacking, and for
the very good reason that Europe does not see a mission for itself that requires
power. Its mission is to oppose power. It is revealing that the argument most
often advanced by Europeans for augmenting their military strength these days
is not that it will allow Europe to expand its strategic purview. It is merely to
rein in and “ multilateralize” the United States. “America,” writes the pro-
American British scholar Timothy Garton Ash in the New York Times (April 9,
2002), “has too much power for anyone’s good, including its own.” Therefore
Europe must amass power, but for no other reason than to save the world and the
United States from the dangers inherent in the present lopsided situation.
Whether that particular mission is a worthy one or not, it seems unlikely to rouse
European passions. Even  Védrine has stopped talking about counterbalancing
the United States. Now he shrugs and declares there “is no reason for the
Europeans to match a country that can fight four wars at once.” It was one thing
for Europe in the 1990s to increase its collective expenditures on defense from
$150 billion per year to $180 billion when the United States was spending $280
billion per year. But now the United States is heading toward spending as much
as $500 billion per year, and Europe has not the slightest intention of keeping
up. European analysts lament the continent’s “strategic irrelevance.”  nato
Secretary General George Robertson has taken to calling Europe a “military
pygmy” in an effort to shame Europeans into spending more and doing so more
wisely. But who honestly believes Europeans will fundamentally change their
way of doing business? They have many reasons not to.
The U.S. response
In thinking about the divergence of their own views and Europeans’, Americans
must not lose sight of the main point: The new Europe is indeed a blessed
miracle and a reason for enormous celebration — on both sides of the Atlantic.
For Europeans, it is the realization of a long and improbable dream: a continent
free from nationalist strife and blood feuds, from military competition and arms
races. War between the major European powers is almost unimaginable. After
centuries of misery, not only for Europeans but also for those pulled into their
conflicts — as Americans were twice in the past century — the new Europe
really has emerged as a paradise. It is something to be cherished and guarded,
not least by Americans, who have shed blood on Europe’s soil and would shed
more should the new Europe ever fail.
Nor should we forget that the Europe of today is very much the product of
American foreign policy stretching back over six decades. European integration
was an American project, too, after World War II. And so, recall, was European
weakness. When the Cold War dawned, Americans such as Dean  AchesonROBERT KAGAN
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hoped to create in Europe a powerful partner against the Soviet Union. But that
was not the only American vision of Europe underlying U.S. policies during the
twentieth century. Predating it was Franklin  Delano Roosevelt’s vision of a
Europe that had been rendered, in effect, strategically irrelevant. As the historian
John Lamberton Harper has put it, he wanted “to bring about a radical reduction
in the weight of Europe” and thereby make possible “the retirement of Europe
from world politics.”
9
Americans who came of age during the Cold War have always thought of
Europe almost exclusively in Achesonian terms — as the essential bulwark of
freedom in the struggle against Soviet tyranny. But Americans of Roosevelt’s
era had a different view. In the late 1930s the common conviction of Americans
was that “the European system was basically rotten, that war was endemic on
that continent, and the Europeans had only themselves to blame for their
plight.”
10 By the early 1940s Europe appeared to be nothing more than the
overheated incubator of world wars that cost America dearly. During World War
II Americans like Roosevelt, looking backward rather than forward, believed no
greater service could be performed than to take Europe out of the global
strategic picture once and for all. “After Germany is disarmed,”  fdr pointedly
asked, “what is the reason for France having a big military establishment?”
Charles DeGaulle found such questions “disquieting for Europe and for France.”
Even though the United States pursued Acheson’s vision during the Cold War,
there was always a part of American policy that reflected Roosevelt’s vision,
too. Eisenhower undermining Britain and France at Suez was only the most
blatant of many American efforts to cut Europe down to size and reduce its
already weakened global influence.
But the more important American contribution to Europe’s current world-apart
status stemmed not from anti-European but from pro-European impulses. It was
a commitment to Europe, not hostility to Europe, that led the United States in
the immediate postwar years to keep troops on the continent and to create nato.
The presence of American forces as a security guarantee in Europe was, as it
was intended to be, the critical ingredient to begin the process of European
integration.
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Europe’s evolution to its present state occurred under the mantle of the U.S.
security guarantee and could not have occurred without it. Not only did the
United States for almost half a century supply a shield against such external
threats as the Soviet Union and such internal threats as may have been posed by
ethnic conflict in places like the Balkans. More important, the United States was
the key to the solution of the German problem and perhaps still is. Germany’s
Fischer, in the Humboldt University speech, noted two “historic decisions” that
made the new Europe possible: “the USA’s decision to stay in Europe” and
“France’s and Germany’s commitment to the principle of integration, beginning
with economic links.” But of course the latter could never have occurred without
the former. France’s willingness to risk the reintegration of Germany into
Europe — and France was, to say the least, highly dubious — depended on the
promise of continued American involvement in Europe as a guarantee against
any resurgence of German militarism. Nor were postwar Germans unaware that
their own future in Europe depended on the calming presence of the American
military.
The United States, in short, solved the Kantian paradox for the Europeans. Kant
had argued that the only solution to the immoral horrors of the Hobbesian world
was the creation of a world government. But he also feared that the “state of
universal peace” made possible by world government would be an even greater
threat to human freedom than the  Hobbesian international order, inasmuch as
such a government, with its monopoly of power, would become “the most
horrible despotism.”
11 How nations could achieve perpetual peace without
destroying human freedom was a problem Kant could not solve. But for Europe
the problem was solved by the United States. By providing security from
outside, the United States has rendered it unnecessary for Europe’s
supranational government to provide it. Europeans did not need power to
achieve peace and they do not need power to preserve it.
The current situation abounds in ironies. Europe’s rejection of power politics, its
devaluing of military force as a tool of international relations, have depended on
the presence of American military forces on European soil. Europe’s new
Kantian order could flourish only under the umbrella of American power
exercised according to the rules of the old Hobbesian order. American power
made it possible for Europeans to believe that power was no longer important.
And now, in the final irony, the fact that United States military power has solved
the European problem, especially the “German problem,” allows Europeans
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today to believe that American military power, and the “strategic culture” that
has created and sustained it, are outmoded and dangerous.
Most Europeans do not see the great paradox: that their passage into post-history
has depended on the United States not making the same passage. Because
Europe has neither the will nor the ability to guard its own paradise and keep it
from being overrun, spiritually as well as physically, by a world that has yet to
accept the rule of “moral consciousness,” it has become dependent on America’s
willingness to use its military might to deter or defeat those around the world
who still believe in power politics.
Some Europeans do understand the conundrum. Some Britons, not surprisingly,
understand it best. Thus Robert Cooper writes of the need to address the hard
truth that although “within the  postmodern world [i.e., the Europe of today],
there are no security threats in the traditional sense,” nevertheless, throughout
the rest of the world — what Cooper calls the “modern and pre-modern zones”
— threats abound. If the  postmodern world does not protect itself, it can be
destroyed. But how does Europe protect itself without discarding the very ideals
and principles that undergird its pacific system?
“The challenge to the postmodern world,” Cooper argues, “is to get used to the
idea of double standards.” Among themselves, Europeans may “operate on the
basis of laws and open cooperative security.” But when dealing with the world
outside Europe, “we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era —
force, preemptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary.” This is Cooper’s
principle for safeguarding society: “Among ourselves, we keep the law but when
we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.”
Cooper’s argument is directed at Europe, and it is appropriately coupled with a
call for Europeans to cease neglecting their  defenses, “both physical and
psychological.” But what Cooper really describes is not Europe’s future but
America’s present. For it is the United States that has had the difficult task of
navigating between these two worlds, trying to abide by, defend, and further the
laws of advanced  civilized society while simultaneously employing military
force against those who refuse to abide by those rules. The United States is
already operating according to Cooper’s double standard, and for the very
reasons he suggests. American leaders, too, believe that global security and a
liberal order — as well as Europe’s “ postmodern” paradise — cannot long
survive unless the United States does use its power in the dangerous, Hobbesian
world that still flourishes outside Europe.
What this means is that although the United States has played the critical role in
bringing Europe into this Kantian paradise, and still plays a key role in making
that paradise possible, it cannot enter this paradise itself. It mans the walls but
cannot walk through the gate. The United States, with all its vast power, remainsPOWER AND WEAKNESS
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stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams and the ayatollahs, the Kim Jong
Ils and the Jiang Zemins, leaving the happy benefits to others.
An acceptable division?
Is this situation tolerable for the United States? In many ways, it is. Contrary to
what many believe, the United States can shoulder the burden of maintaining
global security without much help from Europe. The United States spends a
little over 3 percent of its gdp on defense today. Were Americans to increase
that to 4 percent — meaning a defense budget in excess of $500 billion per year
— it would still represent a smaller percentage of national wealth than
Americans spent on defense throughout most of the past half-century. Even Paul
Kennedy, who invented the term “imperial overstretch” in the late 1980s (when
the United States was spending around 7 percent of its gdp on defense), believes
the United States can sustain its current military spending levels and its current
global dominance far into the future. Can the United States handle the rest of the
world without much help from Europe? The answer is that it already does. The
United States has maintained strategic stability in Asia with no help from
Europe. In the Gulf War, European help was token; so it has been more recently
in Afghanistan, where Europeans are once again “doing the dishes”; and so it
would be in an invasion of Iraq to unseat Saddam. Europe has had little to offer
the United States in strategic military terms since the end of the Cold War —
except, of course, that most valuable of strategic assets, a Europe at peace.
The United States can manage, therefore, at least in material terms. Nor can one
argue that the American people are unwilling to shoulder this global burden,
since they have done so for a decade already. After September 11, they seem
willing to continue doing so for a long time to come. Americans apparently feel
no resentment at not being able to enter a “ postmodern” utopia. There is no
evidence most Americans desire to. Partly because they are so powerful, they
take pride in their nation’s military power and their nation’s special role in the
world.
Americans have no experience that would lead them to embrace fully the ideals
and principles that now animate Europe. Indeed, Americans derive their
understanding of the world from a very different set of experiences. In the first
half of the twentieth century, Americans had a flirtation with a certain kind of
internationalist idealism. Wilson’s “war to end all wars” was followed a decade
later by an American secretary of state putting his signature to a treaty outlawing
war. fdr in the 1930s put his faith in non-aggression pacts and asked merely that
Hitler promise not to attack a list of countries Roosevelt presented to him. But
then came Munich and Pearl  Harbor, and then, after a fleeting moment of
renewed idealism, the plunge into the Cold War. The “lesson of Munich” came
to dominate American strategic thought, and although it was supplanted for aROBERT KAGAN
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time by the “lesson of Vietnam,” today it remains the dominant paradigm. While
a small segment of the American elite still yearns for “global governance” and
eschews military force, Americans from Madeleine  Albright to Donald
Rumsfeld, from Brent  Scowcroft to Anthony Lake, still remember Munich,
figuratively if not literally. And for younger generations of Americans who do
not remember Munich or Pearl  Harbor, there is now September 11. After
September 11, even many American globalizers demand blood.
Americans are idealists, but they have no experience of promoting ideals
successfully without power. Certainly, they have no experience of successful
supranational governance; little to make them place their faith in international
law and international institutions, much as they might wish to; and even less to
let them travel, with the Europeans, beyond power. Americans, as good children
of the Enlightenment, still believe in the perfectibility of man, and they retain
hope for the perfectibility of the world. But they remain realists in the limited
sense that they still believe in the necessity of power in a world that remains far
from perfection. Such law as there may be to regulate international  behavior,
they believe, exists because a power like the United States defends it by force of
arms. In other words, just as Europeans claim, Americans can still sometimes
see themselves in heroic terms — as Gary Cooper at high noon. They will
defend the townspeople, whether the townspeople want them to or not.
The problem lies neither in American will or capability, then, but precisely in
the inherent moral tension of the current international situation. As is so often
the case in human affairs, the real question is one of intangibles — of fears,
passions, and beliefs. The problem is that the United States must sometimes play
by the rules of a Hobbesian world, even though in doing so it violates European
norms. It must refuse to abide by certain international conventions that may
constrain its ability to fight effectively in Robert Cooper’s jungle. It must
support arms control, but not always for itself. It must live by a double standard.
And it must sometimes act unilaterally, not out of a passion for  unilateralism
but, given a weak Europe that has moved beyond power, because the United
States has no choice but to act unilaterally.
Few Europeans admit, as Cooper does implicitly, that such American behavior
may redound to the greater benefit of the civilized world, that American power,
even employed under a double standard, may be the best means of advancing
human progress — and perhaps the only means. Instead, many Europeans today
have come to consider the United States itself to be the outlaw, a rogue colossus.
Europeans have complained about President Bush’s “unilateralism,” but they are
coming to the deeper realization that the problem is not Bush or any American
president. It is systemic. And it is incurable.
Given that the United States is unlikely to reduce its power and that Europe is
unlikely to increase more than marginally its own power or the will to use whatPOWER AND WEAKNESS
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power it has, the future seems certain to be one of increased transatlantic
tension. The danger — if it is a danger — is that the United States and Europe
will become positively estranged. Europeans will become more shrill in their
attacks on the United States. The United States will become less inclined to
listen, or perhaps even to care. The day could come, if it has not already, when
Americans will no more heed the pronouncements of the  eu than they do the
pronouncements of asean or the Andean Pact.
To those of us who came of age in the Cold War, the strategic decoupling of
Europe and the United States seems frightening. DeGaulle, when confronted by
fdr’s vision of a world where Europe was irrelevant, recoiled and suggested that
this vision “risked endangering the Western world.” If Western Europe was to
be considered a “secondary matter” by the United States, would not  fdr only
“weaken the very cause he meant to serve — that of  civilization?” Western
Europe, DeGaulle insisted, was “essential to the West. Nothing can replace the
value, the power, the shining example of the ancient peoples.” Typically,
DeGaulle insisted this was “true of France above all.” But leaving aside French
amour propre, did not DeGaulle have a point? If Americans were to decide that
Europe was no more than an irritating irrelevancy, would American society
gradually become unmoored from what we now call the West? It is not a risk to
be taken lightly, on either side of the Atlantic.
So what is to be done? The obvious answer is that Europe should follow the
course that Cooper, Ash, Robertson, and others recommend and build up its
military capabilities, even if only marginally. There is not much ground for hope
that this will happen. But, then, who knows? Maybe concern about America’s
overweening power really will create some energy in Europe. Perhaps the
atavistic impulses that still swirl in the hearts of Germans, Britons, and
Frenchmen — the memory of power, international influence, and national
ambition — can still be played upon. Some Britons still remember empire; some
Frenchmen still yearn for la gloire; some Germans still want their place in the
sun. These urges are now mostly channeled into the grand European project, but
they could find more traditional expression. Whether this is to be hoped for or
feared is another question. It would be better still if Europeans could move
beyond fear and anger at the rogue colossus and remember, again, the vital
necessity of having a strong America — for the world and especially for Europe.
Americans can help. It is true that the Bush administration came into office with
a chip on its shoulder. It was hostile to the new Europe — as to a lesser extent
was the Clinton administration — seeing it not so much as an ally but as an
albatross. Even after September 11, when the Europeans offered their very
limited military capabilities in the fight in Afghanistan, the United States
resisted, fearing that European cooperation was a ruse to tie America down. The
Bush administration viewed NATO’s historic decision to aid the United StatesROBERT KAGAN
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under Article V less as a boon than as a booby trap. An opportunity to draw
Europe into common battle out in the Hobbesian world, even in a minor role,
was thereby unnecessarily lost.
Americans are powerful enough that they need not fear Europeans, even when
bearing gifts. Rather than viewing the United States as a Gulliver tied down by
Lilliputian threads, American leaders should  realize that they are hardly
constrained at all, that Europe is not really capable of constraining the United
States. If the United States could move past the anxiety engendered by this
inaccurate sense of constraint, it could begin to show more understanding for the
sensibilities of others, a little generosity of spirit. It could pay its respects to
multilateralism and the rule of law and try to build some international political
capital for those moments when  multilateralism is impossible and unilateral
action unavoidable. It could, in short, take more care to show what the founders
called a “decent respect for the opinion of mankind.”
These are small steps, and they will not address the deep problems that beset the
transatlantic relationship today. But, after all, it is more than a cliché that the
United States and Europe share a set of common Western beliefs. Their
aspirations for humanity are much the same, even if their vast disparity of power
has now put them in very different places. Perhaps it is not too naïvely
optimistic to believe that a little common understanding could still go a long
way.